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LOPEz TORRES: A LOST OPPORTUNITY FOR JUDICIAL
REFORM
INTRODUCTION

In 1921, as a reaction to a system viewed as corrupt and ineffective,
the New York Legislature moved from a primary system for selecting
trial court judge nominees to a convention system.1 This convention
system, unique among the fifty states, has come under heavy attack during the past decade. 2 Ironically, many of the same faults critics identified
in the primary system a century ago are now relevant to the convention
system.3 In New York State Board of Elections v. L6pez Torres,4 the
Supreme Court held that the New York system is constitutional. The
Court declined to extend First Amendment protection to judicial candidates who faced substantial burdens because of the inherent flaws in the
New York convention system. By doing so, the Court passed by an opportunity to ensure that New York judges are not beholden to specialinterest groups or backroom politicians.
As this Comment portrays, the Court's narrow characterization of
New York's judicial convention system belies the reality of a system
where political parties have become the de facto appointers of judges. 5
The convention system makes it virtually impossible for individuals not
backed by their party's leaders to gain their party's nomination.6 While
an individual can appear on the ballot as an independent candidate after
satisfying certain requirements, the reality of New York's one-party rule
makes such an effort pointless.7 "[T]he general election is little more
than ceremony" for those individuals whose names appear next to the
dominant political party on the ballot.8 For these reasons, the convention

1. L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 172 (2d. Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128
S. Ct. 791 (2008).
2.
See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of JudicialSelection in
New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 791-97 (2004) (stating that New York has
been the epicenter for a movement calling for reforms to judicial selection processes).
3.
See Ldpez Torres, 462 F.3d at 171-72.
4.
128 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2008).
5.
The Judicial Selection Task Force, Recommendations on the Selection of Judges and the
Improvement of the JudicialSelection System in New York State, 62 THE RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 89, 98-99 (2007) [hereinafter Task Force].
6. See, e.g., Norman L. Greene, What Makes a Good Appointive System for the Selection of
State Court Judges: The Vision of the Symposium, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35, 43-46 (2007) (detailing the significant obstacles faced by individuals not backed by their parties).
7.
L6pez Torres, 462 F.3d at 193-94.
8.
Id. at 178.
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system places an undue burden on these individuals and, in light of past
Supreme Court decisions, is inconsistent with the First Amendment. 9
Part I of this Comment details the basis for a constitutional challenge against a candidate-selection process and explains how New
York's convention system operates. Part II summarizes the Court's
opinion in L6pez Torres, including the facts, procedural history, and opinions. Part 111 explores two topics: (1) the flaws of the Court's narrow
portrayal of the New York convention system; and (2) alternatives to the
convention system including the encouraging effects such alternatives
would have. This Comment concludes that the Court's holding in L6pez
Torres was flawed due to the Court's unwillingness to examine the practical effects of the New York convention system.
I. BACKGROUND

A. ConstitutionalChallenges to State Imposed Candidate-Selection
Processes
Under the First Amendment, a political party is free to choose any
candidate-selection process that will, in its view, produce the best nominee. 10 However, these rights are limited when the State gives the party a
role in the election process.' One such role the State gives a party is the
privilege of having their candidates' names appear on the general election ballot with a party endorsement.' 2 By extending this right, "the
State acquires a legitimate governmental interest in assuring the fairness
of the party's nominating process., 13 This interest gives the State the
prescriptive power to set the candidate-selection process for all such parties.' 4 However, the selection1 5process that the State dictates is subject to
First Amendment limitations.
In California Democratic Party v. Jones,16 the Supreme Court invalidated California's blanket primary system, which allowed citizens to
vote in any party primary, regardless of their current party affiliation.
The Court reasoned that the blanket primary violated the First Amend17
ment by allowing non-party members to determine a party's nominee.
9. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres: Is the Right to Vote a
Constitutional Constraint on Partisan Nominating Conventions?, 6 ELECrION L.J. 399, 403-11
(2007) (discussing the burdens created by New York's convention scheme and the possible models
to evaluate the severity of those burdens).
10. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2008).
11.
Id.
12.
Id. at 797-98.
13.
In addition, a party's conduct may become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 798.
14.
See id.
15.
Id.

16.

530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).

17.
Id. (stating that the blanket primary system placed a severe and unnecessary burden on the
rights of political association).
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The Supreme Court has also invalidated state imposed selection processes for being unduly burdensome or exclusionary on candidates.1 8 In
particular, the Court has determined that candidates must have a reasonable opportunity to appear on the general election ballot. 9
B. New York's Judicial Candidate-SelectionProcess
In New York, the State's trial court of general jurisdiction is the Supreme Court of New York. 20 Each of the State's twelve judicial districts
elects Supreme Court Justices to fourteen-year terms. 2' The current method for selecting Supreme Court Justices follows a convention system
first set forth in 1921.22
New York's convention system consists of a three-part process for
electing Supreme Court Justices. 23 First, the State holds a primary election during which registered party voters select judicial delegates.24
Next, these delegates attend a convention where they select their party's
nominees.25 The chosen nominees automatically appear on the general
26
election ballot with their party affiliation next to their names. Finally,
the State holds a general election during which the voting public in each
judicial district chooses its justices.
Only political parties that received 50,000 or more votes in the most
28
Judicial
recent election for governor can make judicial nominations.
candidates who fail to gain their party's nomination, or whose party does
not meet the 50,000-vote threshold, can gain access to the general election ballot by submitting required nominating petitions. 29 However,
these independent candidates' names appear on the ballot with no party
affiliation.3 °

18. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 804-06 (1983) (holding that an Ohio
statute requiring an unreasonably early filing deadline was unconstitutional).
19. See id. at 801.
20. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
21.
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (a)-(c) (stating that N.Y. is divided into eleven judicial districts,
with the ability to add more, and that the terms of the justices shall be fourteen years); N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 140 (McKinney 2005) (stating that there are twelve judicial districts).
22. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791,796 (2008).
23. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-106, -124, -158, 8-100(1)(c) (McKinney 2007).
24. Id. §§ 6-106, -124.
25. Id. §§ 6-106, -124, -158.
26.
Id. § 7-104(5)(a).
27.
Id. § 8-100(1)(c).
28.
Id. § 1-104(3).
29.
Id. §§ 6-138, -142(2).
30. See id. § 7-116(2).
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H. NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS V. L6PEZ TORRES
A. Facts

Petitioner Margarita L6pez Torres won the Brooklyn Civil Court
Judge election in 1992. 3' Subsequently, members of the Kings County
Democratic Committee, who backed L6pez Torres' nomination, directed
32
L6pez Torres to hire a person of their choosing for her court attorney.
After L6pez Torres refused, Clarence Norman, the committee chair, informed L6pez Torres that she would never become a Supreme Court
Justice.33 In 1995, another committee official, Vito Lopez, informed
L6pez Torres that if she hired his daughter as her court attorney, Lopez
would ensure L6pez Torres' nomination for an upcoming Supreme Court
vacancy.34 L6pez Torres refused to fire her current court attorney and
turned Lopez down.35 From that point forward, L6pez Torres received
no support from the committee for a Supreme Court nomination.36
The lack of support from her party's leaders made it virtually impossible for L6pez Torres to succeed in her pursuit of a Supreme Court
nomination.37 In 1997, L6pez Torres attempted to secure her party's
nomination for the Supreme Court in her judicial district.38 Naively,
L6pez Torres thought she could petition for a nomination at her party's
convention. 39 However, L6pez Torres found that without the support of
her party's leaders, such as Norman and Lopez, not a single delegate
would propose her for nomination. 40 L6pez Torres tried several times
over the next seven years to gain her party's nomination. 4' Each time,
because of her past conflicts with Norman and L6pez, her attempt to gain
her party's nomination failed.42
B. ProceduralHistory

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the
New York convention system for judicial nominations was unconstitu31.
L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 178 (2d Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128
S. Ct. 791 (2008).
32. L6pez Torres contacted a former employer of the applicant and received a less then favorable assessment. Id. at 179.
33. Norman told L6pez Torres that she "did not understand the way it works." He went on to
state that someday L6pez Torres would want to become a Supreme Court Justice and the party
leaders would "not forget this." Quite bluntly, Norman stated that without the committee's support,
L6pez Torres' Supreme Court nomination "will not happen." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 179-81.
37. See id.
38. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lpez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2008).
39.
L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 179 (2d Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128
S. Ct. 791 (2008).
40. Id.
41.
See id. at 180.
42.
See id. at 180-81.
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tional.43 The Second Circuit found that the system effectively transformed the process of electing justices into a scheme of de facto appointment by party leaders. 44 In making its determination, the court rejected the state's argument that First Amendment protections only apply
to direct primaries as opposed to the indirect primaries New York employs.4 5 The court went on to state that the First Amendment not only
grants candidates access to a nominating process, but also affords a realistic opportunity to participate in the process. 46 Participation must be
free from severe and unnecessary burdens.47 The court also noted that
exclusion from a nominating process does not necessarily have to be
categorical in nature, but can result from the aggregation of otherwise
valid election regulations.48
In holding the New York system unconstitutional, the Second Circuit found the system imposed severe burdens on candidates and was
exclusionary in nature.49 The court also held that an alternate means of
access to the general election, namely access as an independent candidate, does not automatically render the system constitutional. °
C. Majority Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
New York convention system violates the First Amendment rights of
prospective party candidates.51 In a unanimous opinion written by Jus52
tice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision.
The Court held that New York is free to use a convention system for
selecting candidates and the First Amendment does not compel New
York to use a different system.53 The Court made three findings in determining that New York's judicial candidate-selection process is constitutional.54
First, the Court found the requirements the convention system imposed upon candidates reasonable.5 5 Specifically, the requirement that a
candidate collect five hundred valid party signatures from his or her dis43. See id. at 208.
44.
Id. at 200.
45. Id. at 186 ("[C]onstitutional protection attaches to all integral phases of the nominating
process, regardless of whether the nomination is conferred directly by public ballot or indirectly by
the votes of elected party officials.").
Id. at 187.
46.
47. Id.
48. Id. ("Further, while categorical race and sex-based exclusions undoubtedly violate the
associational rights of voters and candidates, exclusions that result from a complex of otherwise
facially valid regulations also may offend the First Amendment.") (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 195-201, 208.
50.
Id. at 194-95.
51.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 795 (2008).
52.
Id. at 794, 801.
53. See id. at 801.
54.
See id. at 798-801.
Id. at 798.
55.
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trict within a thirty-seven day timeframe was well within the scope of
requirements the Court had previously upheld.56 While prior Supreme
Court decisions analyzing the reasonableness of primary election requirements involved the right to vote,57 the
Court noted that the same
58
principles are applicable to the right to run.
Second, the Court found the Constitution does not require that candidates receive a "fair shot" at securing their party's nomination. 59 Although the Court recognized that the party leadership effectively determined the nominees, it refused to look beyond the bare requirements to
"the manner in which political actors function under those requirements. ' 6° Relying on an institutional-competency argument, the Court
noted that determining what constitutes a fair shot is better left to the
legislature and is an inappropriate constitutional question for judges.61
Third, the Court rejected the argument that the convention system
was unconstitutional based upon the pervasiveness of New York judicial
districts with one-party rule. 62 The Court focused only on the requirements to gain access to the general election ballot as an independent candidate, and found these requirements reasonable.6 3 Any measures to
make the general election more competitive, beyond reasonable access to
the general ballot, were not constitutionally required. 64 The Court noted
that one-party entrenchment had never been a basis for interfering with a
candidate-selection process.65
D. Concurring Opinions
Justice Stevens's short concurring opinion, in which Justice Souter
joined, stressed that the Court's opinion is not an endorsement of New
York's candidate-selection process. 66 Quoting Thurgood Marshall, Jus-

tice Stevens noted that "[t]he Constitution does not prohibit legislatures
from enacting stupid laws.

67

56.
Id. at 798-99 (stating that the requirement for a five hundred signature petition in a thirtyseven day period is "entirely reasonable").
57.
See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 52, 61 (1973) (holding an Illinois election law that
prevented some individuals from voting in their party's primary was unconstitutional); Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756, 762 (1973) (holding a New York election law placing temporal
enrollment requirements on individuals to vote in a party's primary was constitutional).
58. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 798 (2008).
59.
Id. at 799.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62. Id. at 800.
63. See id. at 798, 800.
64.
Id. at 800.
65. Id. at 800-01 (stating that the First Amendment "does not call on the federal courts to
manage the market by preventing too many buyers from settling upon a single product").
66.
Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, in which Justice Breyer
joined in part, is notable in that it comments on New York's use of elections to select judges.68 Justice Kennedy noted that judicial elections
require candidates to conduct campaigns and raise funds, which leaves
the candidates open to influence by special-interest groups and political
parties. 69 Justice Kennedy questioned whether this process was consistent with the desire for judicial independence and excellence. 70 He concluded, however, that as flawed as the New York system might be, the
present suit did not permit the Court to intervene on constitutional
grounds.7'

III. ANALYSIS
In its opinion for L6pez Torres, the Court focused only on the bare
requirements set forth by New York election law, thereby narrowly portraying the effects of the convention system on judicial candidates and
the voting public. Specifically, the system places an undue burden on
candidates seeking a nomination, effectively excluding them from both
the nomination process and general election. As such, the Court incorrectly determined that the New York convention system was constitutional under the First Amendment. In doing so, the Court passed by an
opportunity to compel New York to adopt an alternative candidateselection process that protects First Amendment rights. This alternative
could have far-reaching, positive effects on New York's judicial system.
A. The Flaws in the Court'sNarrow Portrayalof the New York System
By focusing only on the bare requirements set forth in New York
election law, the Court did not consider the practical effects these requirements have on judicial candidates and the voting public. However,
past Supreme Court decisions have taken the practical effects of election
requirements into consideration, and based upon those effects, held state
election laws unconstitutional.72
By narrowly portraying the New York convention system, the Court
failed to address several significant, unconstitutional effects of the system. Specifically, the Court erred in three ways: (1) it failed to address
properly the aggregate effect of the requirements and the burden these
requirements place upon candidates; (2) it ignored the exclusionary effect of New York's convention system on judicial candidates; and (3) it
68. Id. at 801, 803 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 803.
70. Id. (stating that a selection process that is open to manipulation, criticism, and serious
abuse is unfair to the concept ofjudicial independence).
71.

See id.

72. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (holding that a Texas filing fee was
unconstitutional because of the fee's effect on candidates); see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 24 (1968) (holding that an Ohio election law was unconstitutional because of the law's effect on
new political parties).
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did not give sufficient weight to the convention system's effect on the
independence and quality of New York Supreme Court Justices.
1. Significant Burden Placed on Individuals Seeking a Nomination
During the primary election phase of the New York convention system, candidates not backed by their party face obstacles so burdensome
that success is virtually impossible.73 Judicial candidates themselves do
not take part in the primary elections. 74 Instead, "rank-and-file party
members elect judicial delegates" who attend the party's convention and
select the party's nominees.7 5 Consequently, a judicial candidate must
assemble a slate of delegates to run on his or her behalf, trusting these
delegates will nominate him or her at the convention.76
Each judicial district within New York is comprised of between
nine and twenty-four assembly districts.77 Small subgroups of potential
delegates run against each other in each assembly district.78 In effect, the
primary election consists of a series of contests between groups of delegates within each assembly district.79
To appear on the primary ballot, each delegate is required to gather
five hundred valid signatures from party members residing in his or her
particular assembly district within a thirty-seven day period. 80 Because
signatures are often challenged, delegates "must realistically gather be''
tween 1000 and 1500 signatures to gain a primary ballot position. 81
Therefore, depending on the number of assembly districts in his or her
judicial district, a judicial candidate is responsible for between 9,000 and
24,000 signatures to ensure his or her slate of delegates appears on the
primary ballot. 82 Additionally, the primary ballot does not indicate the

judicial candidate with whom each delegate is associated.8 3 This has the
effect of requiring judicial candidates to mount a separate voter education campaign for each assembly district. 84
The aggregate effect of these requirements places a significant burden on candidates lacking support from their political party, even for

73. See L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 172-75 (2d. Cir. 2006),
rev'd, 128 S.Ct. 791 (2008).
74. Id. at 172.
75. Id.
76.
Id.
77.

Id.

78. Id. (citing N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-124 (McKinney 2007)).
79. Id.
80. N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-134(4), 136(2)(i) (McKinney 2007).
81.
Lrpez Torres, 462 F.3d at 173 (stating that because each party member can sign only one
petition, signatures are routinely and successfully challenged under the one-petition signature rule).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. (stating that the candidate must inform the primary electorate in each assembly
district of which delegates are pledged to him or her).
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those who possess significant public support.85 However, candidates
who are backed by their local party leadership "easily navigate the pri-86
mary system with the benefit of the party's pre-existing apparatus.
Because of the burden placed upon candidates not backed by their party,
the vast majority of primary elections are uncontested. 87 Thus, the majority of party-backed delegates run unopposed, are simply deemed
elected, and do not even appear on the primary ballot.88
In past decisions, the Supreme Court has looked at the aggregate effect of election requirements in determining constitutionality. For example, in Williams v. Rhodes, the Court looked at the totality of the effect of
Ohio's election laws in determining whether the requirements were unconstitutionally burdensome on political parties seeking to appear on the
state ballot. 89 To appear on the state ballot, Ohio election law required
new political parties to collect a large number of signatures, file earlier
than existing parties, and conduct a primary election that conformed to
detailed and rigorous standards. 90 The Court noted that the laws made it
virtually impossible for some political parties, regardless of how much
popular support they had, to appear successfully on the state ballot. 9' In
holding that the Ohio election laws were unconstitutional, the Court considered the aggregate effect of the requirements, rather than considering
each bare requirement on its own.92
The New York system places a similar unconstitutional burden on
candidates not backed by their party. L6pez Torres enjoyed popular support from the public, but lacked her party's support. As evidenced by her
lack of success, and the lack of success of many other candidates not
backed by their party,93 the burden on these individuals is impossibly
high.94 The New York system has the practical effect of requiring candidates to collect up to 24,000 signatures in thirty-seven days and hold a
separate voter education campaign in up to twenty-four assembly districts.95 Taken together, the effects of these requirements make seeking a
nomination impractical without the institutional support of a candidate's
party. Thus, the New York system places an unconstitutional burden on
candidates not backed by their parties.

85. See id. at 174-75.
86. Id. at 175.
87. See id. (stating that between 1999 and 2002, four counties did not field a single contested
delegate race).
88.
Id. ("This kind of invisible, automatic 'election' is the norm rather than the exception.").
89. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
90. See id. at27.
at24.
91. Id.
92. See id. at38.
93. See Lrpez Torres, 462 F.3d at174.
94. See id.
95. Id. at197.
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2. Exclusionary Effect of the Requirements on Judicial Candidates
In L6pez Torres, the Court determined that the requirements for a
delegate to get on the primary ballot were not exclusionary. 96 By not
considering the practical effects of the New York system, the Court ignored its exclusionary nature. Just as it has when considering the burden
election requirements place on candidates, the Supreme Court has also
taken the practical effects of election requirements into consideration
when analyzing whether the requirements are exclusionary.
In Bullock v. Carter, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of a
Texas filing fee for primary elections.97 Instead of simply examining the
specific dollar amount required by Texas law, the Court looked at the
effect the fee had on particular candidates. 98 The Court noted that candidates lacking both personal wealth and affluent background are in every
practical sense precluded from seeking their party's nomination.99 As
such, the Court held that the fee was exclusionary.' ° Additionally, the
fee had the effect of substantially limiting the voters' choices during the
primary election.' 0 '
In practice, the New York election scheme has a similar exclusionary effect. As detailed above,10 2 the lack of support of their party's leaders essentially excludes candidates from their party's nomination process. Just as the filing fee in Bullock had the practical effect of excluding
candidates lacking particular resources, the New York scheme has the
practical effect of excluding candidates who refuse to play the game with
their political party.
The exclusionary nature of the New York system goes beyond just
the primary election. Once the party delegates are determined, the nominating convention takes place. No debate or competition takes place at
the nominating convention. 0 3 The vast majority of nominations are by
unanimous voice vote.10 4 Because the vast majority of nominations are
uncontested, many delegates choose not to attend the nominating convention. 105 Consequently, delegate absentee rates have been as high as

96.
See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 798 (2008).
97.
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 135 (1972).
98.
See id. at 143.
99.
Id.
100. See id. at 143-44 (stating that the Texas scheme had a real and appreciable impact on
particular candidates) (emphasis added).
101.
See id. at 149.
102.
See supra notes 73-88, 93-95 and accompanying text.
103.
L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 178 (2d Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128
S. Ct. 791 (2008).
104.
Id. (stating that between 1990 and 2002, over ninety-six percent of nominations went
uncontested).
105.
Id. ("Not only were the conventions devoid of debate and competition, they were fleeting.
Over a 12-year span, conventions statewide averaged a mere 55 minutes in length. In 1996, the
Second Judicial District's convention lasted II minutes but yielded eight nominations.").
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sixty-nine percent. 106 Candidates whose slate of delegates was unsuccessful at the primary election have 107
no chance of securing the nomination independently at the convention.
Candidates nominated at the convention appear on the general election ballot with their party designation.' °8 For those candidates associated with the majority political party, the general election is "little more
than ceremony" due to one-party rule in most judicial districts. 10 9 During
a twelve-year period ending in 2002, in eight of the state's twelve judicial districts, almost half of the Supreme Court Justice elections were
uncontested. 110 In the Sixth Judicial District during this period, the uncontested rate was ninety-one percent.'11
When the Court examined whether the general election was exclusionary, it looked only at the requirement to gain access to the general
election ballot as an independent candidate, not at the practical effect of
trying to do so.'1 2 The Court stated that a candidate's interests are protected as long as the candidate has "an adequate opportunity to appear on
the general-election ballot."' 13 The Court did not address the domino
effect the New York system has on candidates not backed by their parties. In reality, candidates not backed by their party are not able to secure a nomination and thus cannot appear on the general election ballot
with their party designation. 14 Without a party designation, candidates
cannot win the general election.' 15 In effect, the system excludes certain
types of candidates during the general election, just as it does during the
primary and convention phases, by making success impossible.
The Court has also expressed concern over the exclusionary effects
of requirements when they "limit the field of candidates from which voters can choose."' 1 6 In examining these effects, the Court has stated, "it is
essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters."' 1 7 While the New York system may not directly limit
the field of candidates in the general election, it does effectively limit the
field of candidates during the nominating convention. 1 8 Thus, the sys-

106. Id.
107. See id. at 176-77.
108.
See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 802 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
109. Ldpez Torres, 462 F.3d at 178.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112. See Lepez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 800.
113. Id.
114.
See supra notes 73-88, 93-95, 108 and accompanying text.
115.
See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
116.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 143 (1972) stating that restrictions that limit voters' choices are of a primary concern).
117. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
118.
See supra notes 82-88, 94-95 and accompanying text.
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tern has an appreciable impact on voters by limiting the general ballot to
candidates that each party has sanctified.
3. The Effect on the Independence and Quality of New York
Supreme Court Justices
The New York system also has a negative effect on the independence and quality of New York Supreme Court Justices. 1 9 While these
negative effects alone may be insufficient to deem the New York system
unconstitutional, they warrant consideration with regard to the overall
effect of the system on the public. 12 Because the Court did not consider
the practical effects of the New York system, it failed to give any weight
to these judicial independence and quality concerns.
As detailed above, 12 the New York convention system results in
party leaders effectively determining who will become a Supreme Court
Justice. As noted by the Commission to Promote Public Confidence in
Judicial Elections, 22 the system "vests almost total control in the hands
of local political leaders ....
The Task Force on Judicial Diversity' 24
further noted that because ' of
one-party rule, "most often this nomination
25
is tantamount to election." 1
Knowing success is impossible without their party leaders, candidates feel the need to be responsive to their party in order to obtain and
retain their positions. 26 This increased level of political pressure affects
a judge's decisions and thus judicial independence. 127 After all, judicial
independence can only exist if there is immunity from outside political
pressures in the resolution of individual cases. 128 L6pez Torres was denied a nomination because she refused to hire a particular law clerk.
Likely, political parties will make further demands once individuals get
on the bench.

119. See Zeidman, supra note 2, at 803-29.
120. See Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1046 (2007) (stating
that if elections "introduce random volatility and noise into the selection or retention of judges, they
are certainly a bad thing.").
121.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
122.
New York State's Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye created the Commission to Promote Public
Confidence in Judicial Elections in 2003. The New York State Commission to Promote Public
Confidence in Judicial Elections, http:/law.fordham.edulcommissionljudicialelections/main.ihtml
(last visited October 30, 2008). The Commission was charged with determining how to better improve voter participation in the judicial election process. The Commission included judges, academics, public servants, and private practitioners. L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d
161, 172-76 (2d. Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008).
123.
Ldpez Torres, 462 F.3d at 181.
124.
Created by Governor Mario Cuomo in 1991 to study minority representation in the New
York judiciary. Id.
125.
Id.
126. See Zeidman, supra note 2, at 826-27.
127.
Id. at 825.
128.
Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, The Ideologies of Judicial Selection: Empiricism and
the Transformation of the JudicialSelection Debate, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 551, 559-60 (2008).
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Additionally, otherwise qualified candidates may choose not to pursue a judgeship because they are not politically savvy or are unwilling to
play the political game. 129 This affects the overall quality of Supreme
savvy] campaigner
Court Justices since the "qualities of a [politically
130
may be very different from those of a good judge."'
B. Alternative Judicial Candidate-SelectionProcesses
Although the Court did not force New York to change its convention system, change nevertheless seems likely.13' There are a number of
alternative candidate-selection processes available should New York
abandon the current system. While none of the alternatives address all of
the concerns with judicial selection, two alternatives are a marked improvement over New York's current system. If New York opts to maintain judicial elections, the current convention system could be reformed.
If judicial elections are deserted, a commission-based appointive system
may be the best alternative.
1. Reformed Convention System
Although the New York convention system is flawed, it does not
need to be completely abandoned. If New York is determined to continue electing Supreme Court Justices, reforms could be made to the current convention system to address the concerns outlined above. These
reforms, however, should be limited. For example, there would be several problems with moving from the current system to a primary-only
election model. A primary election would force candidates to raise large
sums of money and conduct campaigns, just as the convention system
does. 132 In fact, the costs and burdens of running a district-wide primary
campaign33 would likely be "more daunting" than under the convention
system.
Keeping these concerns in mind, the Judicial Selection Task
35
Force 134 has proposed reforms to the current convention system.
While the Task Force prefers a commission-based appointment system, it
recognizes that reforms may be needed before the New York State Constitution can be amended. 136 The Task Force's proposal consists of several changes to the current system.

129.
Zeidman, supra note 2, at 826.
130. Id.
131.
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 6, at 41-47 (explaining the political climate in New York
after the district court and Second Circuit decisions); see also Zeidman, supra note 2, at 829-31.
132.
Task Force, supra note 5, at 108.
133.
Id.
134.
The Judicial Selection Task Force was created by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York in March of 2006. The Task Force's mission was to make recommendations on improving the judicial selection system in New York State. Id. at 91.
135.
Id. at 107-16.
136.
Id. at 107.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

First, each judicial district would be divided up into judicial convention districts, for the purpose of nominating justices. 137 These convention
districts would be grouped into eight geographic regions. 38 Within each
region, 9a judicial qualification commission (JQC) would be estab13
lished.

JQCs would consist of twenty-one members.140 These members
would include executive, legislative and judicial government representatives, as well as a mix of community members from inside and outside
the legal profession.141 JQC members would be limited to serving on the
42
committee for no more than three consecutive years.1
Potential judicial candidates would be required to submit their qualifications to the JQC.1 43 The JQC would then determine the three most
qualified candidates for the first vacancy.144 The next two most qualified
45
candidates would then be recommended for each additional vacancy.
However, if an incumbent were to seek reelection, and the JQC determined that the incumbent was highly qualified,
he or she would be the
146
JQC's only recommendation for the vacancy.
Delegates to each party's convention would still be selected by a
primary election. 147 However, the signature requirement to appear on the
primary ballot would be decreased. 48 More importantly, delegates
would be allowed to identify the candidate they have pledged to nominate, thereby removing the need for candidates to run multiple voter edu149
cation campaigns.

Prior to both the primary and general election, the JQC would publish a judicial voters' guide, complete with biographical information on
each candidate who submitted his or her qualifications.150 The guide
would also include the JQC's recommendations for each judicial vacancy. 151 The Task Force notes that these reforms retain several flaws of
137. Id. at 112 (stating that each judicial convention district would consist of two or three
assembly districts).
138.

Id.

139.

JQCs would not be limited to reviewing the qualifications of only Supreme Court Justices.
They would also review candidates for District and City Courts, the Civil Court of the City of New
York, the Surrogate and County Courts, and the Family Court outside of the City of New York. Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id. (stating that each JQC should broadly represent the community within its region,
including race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and sexual orientation as diversity factors).
142.
Id.at 113.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.at113-14.
148.
Id. at 114 (stating that delegates would need two hundred signatures at most).
149.
Id.
150.

Id. at 114-15.

151.
Id. (stating that the guide would indicate in each candidate's biographical entry whether
the candidate was rated most qualified, highly qualified, or unqualified).
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the current system. 52 However, the Task Force recognizes that a commission-based appointive system, which would require an amendment to
the New York State Constitution, could take time to implement.153 As
such, reforms to the current system could alleviate some of the concerns
in a more timely fashion.
2. Moving Away from Judicial Elections
a. The Concern with Judicial Elections
As pointed out by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion, "the
Framers did not provide for election of federal judges, [but] most states
have made the opposite choice, at least to some extent."1 54 While states
have the authority to hold elections for state judges, there are many concerns in relation to judicial elections. 15 The most common concerns
involve the reality of what candidates must do to win judicial elections.156 This includes the costs and combative nature of elections, as
well as the concern that judges will decide cases based upon what is
popular, and not based upon the law and facts.157
In addition, there is an expectation among the public that judges
should be as independent and impartial as possible.158 However, the
"need to raise campaign funds, among other things, threatens the appearance (or fact) of impartiality. ' t 59 Independence also suffers when political leaders control elections, which is an occurrence New York's convention system facilitates. These elective systems elevate party favorites
and value party loyalty over the quality of the candidate.1 60 The need for

152. Id. at 109-11 (stating that even under the reformed system candidates would still face
burdens and costs).
153. Id.at 111.
154. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
155.
See David E. Pozen, The Irony of JudicialElections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 269 (2008)
(stating that competitive judicial elections undermine the capacity of state courts to safeguard nonjudicial elections and public values); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2168, 2204-05 (2006) (describing several concerns including the possibility that elected judges are
more likely to be biased against out-of-state residents). But see Carolyn Dineen King, Current
Challenges to the Federal Judiciary, 66 LA. L. REV. 661, 667 (2006) (arguing that the appointive
system for federal appellate judges conveys to the public "the notion that the Judiciary is yet another
political branch of government, a kind of stepchild of the other two branches . . . and when the
Judiciary is perceived as a stepchild of the political branches of government, the separation of the
three branches of government is impaired.").
156.
See Pozen, supra note 155, at 267-68, 278.
157.
See id. at 277 (stating that elected judges will tend to be more sensitive to popular opinion); Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1081
(2007) ("Judicial elections have become nastier, nosier, and costlier.").
158.
See L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 803 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159.
Greene, supra note 6, at 38. See also Marilyn S. Kite, Wyoming's Judicial Selection
Process: Is it Getting the Job Done?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 203 (2007) ("Public perception of
political influence on the judiciary, whether through money or political affiliation, undermines the
citizenry's confidence in the integrity of the system.").
160.
Greene, supra note 6, at 38.
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Such a concern has long
an independent judiciary cannot be overstated.
1 61
been a part of politics in the United States.
Many of these concerns have been validated. A report prepared by
Professor Steven Zeidman,1 62 which compared the relative quality of
appointed and elected judges in New York, found that elected judges "far
' 63
surpass their appointed colleagues in incidents of judicial discipline.'
In addition, Professor Zeidman found that elections result in a less diverse judiciary. 164
b. Commission-Based Appointments
In reaction to these concerns, several groups have advocated that
New York move away from judicial elections to commission-based appointments.1 65 The groups suggest that commission-based appointments
would remove political considerations from judicial selection as much as
possible and increase the quality of state judges. 66 The groups advocate
the formation of commissions, consisting of government and community
members, which
would make merit-based recommendations for judicial
67
appointments. 1
For example, the Judicial Selection Task Force suggests that New
York create JQCs, similar to the ones discussed above, which would
to the Governor for state judicial appointmake 16
recommendations
8
ments.

During a symposium held at Fordham Law School in 2006, partici169
pants made several suggestions for commission-based appointments.
Participants stressed that the commissions should be as diverse as possi161. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961)
(stating that the independent spirit of judges is essential to the faithful performance of their duties).
162.
Steven Zeidman is an Associate Professor at CUNY School of Law. Zeidman, supra note
2, at 836 n.al.
163.
Id. at 809. But see Michael E. DeBow, State Judicial Selection: Once More Unto the
at
http://www.fed(2008),
available
9
ENGAGE
128,
128
Breach,
soc.org/publicationstpubID.696/pub-detail.asp (follow "State Judicial Selection: Once More Unto
the Breach" hyperlink) ("There is a large body of social science research on state supreme courts and
it shows that there is no real, observable difference between the judges chosen in merit selection
states, and those chosen in other states.").
164.
Zeidman, supra note 2, at 817 (stating that when examined on a statewide basis, elections
produce a disproportionally white judiciary).
165.
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 6, at 41 (stating that the best permanent solution would be to
move away from judicial elections to a merit-based appointment system); Task Force, supra note 5,
at 93 ("[T]he Task Force firmly reiterates the Association's long-standing position in favor of a
commission-based appointive system.").
166. See Zeidman, supra note 2, at 834; Mark S. Cady & Jess R. Phelps, Preservingthe Delicate Balance Between JudicialAccountability and Independence: Merit Selection in the Post-White
World, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 343, 345 (2008).

167.
See Zeidman, supra note 2, at 831-32.
168.
Task Force, supra note 5, at 103-08.
169.
The symposium's purpose was to guide the reform of judicial selection processes. Participants included political scientists, lawyers, law professors, and judges from various states. See
Greene, supra note 6, at 36-37.
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ble with respect to race, political affiliation, and legal specialty. 170 They
also suggested that the commission proceedings be open to the public to
avoid secrecy and public distrust of the process. 17 1 However, one participant7 2cautioned that excessive openness might drive away some candidates. 1
Professor Zeidman has also outlined a commission-based appointment system. Like several other groups, he suggests that the nominating
commission be as diverse as possible. 173 He notes that the more diverse
the commission, "the more likely it is to produce a representative and
high quality judiciary."'174 The commission would identify, recruit, inter75
view, evaluate, and recommend candidates to the appointing authority. 1
The appointing authority, likely a designated executive, would choose
from the recommended candidates within a specified time frame. 176 Professor Zeidman also advocates that states move away from retention
elections and instead charge the nominating commission
with recom77
mending whether an existing judge be retained.
CONCLUSION
By ignoring the significant practical effects of the New York convention system, the Court incorrectly held that the system was constitutional. Although the Court stated that it had not focused on "the manner
in which political actors function under... [election] requirements," past
decisions are inconsistent with that assertion. 78 In reality, the New York
system places significant burdens on candidates, excludes candidates not
backed by their party, and endangers the independence and quality of the
judiciary.
The Court declined an opportunity to push New York towards a judicial selection process that would benefit both judicial candidates and
the public. Such alternatives would increase the quality and diversity of
the judiciary while raising the public's confidence in the judicial system.
The importance of such judicial reforms cannot be underestimated. As
Justice Kennedy stated, "[t]he rule of law, which is the foundation of
freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for its independ-

170. See id. at 49.
171.
Id. at 56-58.
172.
Id. at 60 (stating that discussions within the commission should remain private, while
names of finalists should be publicized).
173.
Zeidman, supra note 2, at 831-32.
174.
Id. at 832.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 833 (stating that the commission would recommend whether to reappoint the judge
based upon judicial performance evaluations and reviews).
178.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 799 (2008).
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ence, its179 professional attainments, and the absolute probity of its

judges."'

Justin Schneider*

Id. at 803 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179.
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